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BAR BRIEFS
ANNUAL MEETING-SUGGESTIONS
The next annual meeting of the State Bar Association will be
held at Bismarck, N. D., on September 18th and 19th, 1941,
under the auspices of the Burleigh County Bar Association.
The plan inaugurated at the annual meeting last year at
Fargo of a short legal institute will be continued under the joint
guidance of the committee on the Legal Institute of which George
A. Soule of Fargo is chairman, the local committee of the Burleigh
County Bar, and your state officers.
And at this time we need the cooperation of the members in
suggesting topics that they wish to have presented on this pro-
gram, as well as lawyers who, in their judgment, are qualified to
present practical discussions of their particular fields of law prac-
tice. Such suggestions can be sent to your secretary at the office
of the association at Dickinson, N. D.
NAVIGABLE WATERS - WHAT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION IS A NAVIGABLE STREAM
This is an action by the United States to enjoin the
construction of a dam on the New River in Virginia without a
license from the Federal Power Commission, as provided for in
the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. The respondent sets forth
the following defenses: (1) That the New River is non-navigable;
(2) That should the New River be declared navigable the con-
ditions of any federal license must be strictly limited to the pro-
tection of the navigable capacity of the waters of the United
States; (3) That the Commission's refusal to grant a minor part
license containing only such conditions was unlawful, and that
any relief should be conditioned upon the Commission's granting
respondent such a license. Held, the New River is navigable and
subject to federal control under the delegated powers in the Com-
merce Clause. (2) That the term navigation as construed cov-
ers more than just the control of the waterway itself. The Court
states that the power is as broad as the needs of commerce, and
that navigable waters are the subject of natural control and
planning is the broad regulation of commerce granted to the fed-
eral government. (3) That the license may contain these pro-
visions which the Commission may deem necessary in the exer-
cise of supervision and control over such navigable waters.
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 61 S. Ct.
291 (1940).
The above decision is the farthest the Supreme Court has
ever gone by judicial construction in advancing the development
of the federal control over rivers. The rule followed up to the
time of this case was found in this Court's decision in The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1868), stated as follows: "Those
rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
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are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary con-
dition, as highways of commerce, over which trade and travel
are, or may be, conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the state, when
they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by unit-
ing with other waters, a continued highway over which com-
merce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign coun-
tries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conduct-
ed by water." This rule from The Daniel Ball case was the basis
of the holding by the District Court and by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, to the effect that the New River was not navigable. The
early common law rule was that all rivers affected by the ebb
and flow of the tides were navigable. Grand Rapids and Indiana
Railroad Company v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 15 S. Ct. 991, 40 L. Ed.
85 (1895). But this rule has not found wide acceptance in the
United States and Canada because of the great fresh water lakes
and inland rivers found so commonly here, as to which the
common law rule was inapplicable. In The Montello, 20 Wall. 450,
22 L. Ed. 391 (1853), the court held that the probability of use of
waterway by the public for purposes of transportation and com-
merce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river.
In the Economy Light and Power Company v. United States, 256
U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 409, 65 L. Ed. 847 (1920), the Court said
navigability does not depend on the type of use or the difficulties
attending navigation, such as falls, rapids, and sandbars, even
though these be so great that they prevent the use of the best
means of commerce. It is dependent rather upon whether the
stream in its natural state is such that it affords a channel for
useful commerce.
Among the considerations of prime importance in the de-
termination of the navigability of rivers are: First-Its natural
navigability. This is essential; no legislative enactment can de-
clare a stream to be navigable when it is not so in its natural
state. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 S. Ct. 380, 61 L.
Ed. 746 (1916). Secondly-The depth or capacity for floatage.
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197,
70 L. Ed. 465 (1925). Thirdly-In general, a stream must be
used for trade or agriculture rather than for mere pleasure, and
must be capable of sustaining more than a mere rowboat to be
termed a navigable stream. North American Drege Company
v. Mintzer, 245 Fed. 297, 157 C. C. A. 489 (1917). Fourthly-
In order for a stream to be classified as navigable it need not be
navigable in its entirety. It can be navigable in part only, and
still be regarded as navigable in the parts that are navigable..
St. Anthony Falls Water Company v. St. Paul Water Commission,
168 U. S. 349, 118 S. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 497 (1897). A stream
that can be made navigable is navigable within the meaning of
the constitution, and the true test of navigability is the capacity
of the stream to be used after improvement for the purposes of
transportation and commerce.. This is a question of fact, the
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burden of establishing such resting upon the party affirming it.
Charles L. Barnes v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 7 (1910).
Among the powers delegated to the federal government by
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is the exclusive control
of the navigable waters of the United States. The expansion of
the nation, the development of the scope of the constitution by
judicial construction, and, finally, the powers assumed by the
federal government, because of the exigencies of the great war,
have all contributed to the development of an extreme federal at-
titude, a tendency toward federal control over rivers and lakes
without regard for the rights of the states to control non-navi-
gable waters. The precedents of the Supreme Court have uni-
formily tended towards the enlargement of federal authority and
the whittling away of the powers of the states. Le Beouf, State
or Federal Control of the Water Powers of Navigable Streams,
(1927) 15 Geo. L J. 201. In the Daniel Ball, supra, the court
justified congressional jurisdiction over waters which had not
been used for interstate commerce theretofore, but were suscep-
tible of being so used. In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall, 713,
18 L. Ed. 96 (1865), a more complete federalization of navigable
waters was accomplished. The court held that commerce in-
cluded navigation, that the power to regulate commerce compre-
hends control, for that purpose and to the extent necessary, of
all the navigable waters of the United States, which are acces-
sible from a state other than that in which it lies; that for this
purpose, they are public property of the nation and subject to the
requisite control of Congress. This necessarily includes the
power to keep open and free from any obstruction to navigation,
interposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such obstruc-
tions when they exist, and to provide for the punishment of of-
fenders. For those purposes Congress possessed all the powers
which existed in the states before the adoption of the National
Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament
of England. It is for Congress to determine when its power shall
be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions
which shall be provided.
The conclusive demonstration that the courts have created
an independent life for the legal concept of navigation, based on
the necessity of eliminating state-created barriers to national
economic development, came in Arizona v. California, 283 U. S.
423, 51 S. Ct. 522, 75 L. Ed. 1154 (1931), where the Supreme
Court held a simple congressional declaration that the shallow
and rapid Colorado River was, in fact, navigable, justification
for federal control, regardless of unanimous contrary testimony
by regional hydrologic experts as to its actual navigability.
Projects not affecting navigable waters require a license from
the Federal Water Power Commission for the construction of
dams or structures on rivers, even though they be not listed as
navigable waters or affected with interstate commerce. 16 U. S.
C. (sec.) 817. Section twenty-three of the present Act requires
projects in non-traversible streams to be licensed, whenever the
Commission finds "that the interests of interstate or foreign
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commerce would be affected by such proposed construction .... "
49 Stat. 846 (1935). Thus once a relationship of the proposed
project to navigation, either foreign or interstate, is found there
is no longer a question as to the right of the Federal Water
Power Commission to control such project very effectively.
THOMAS McCARTY,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In The First National Bank of Waseca, a Corporation, Respt., v. William
L. Paulson, as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of A. P.
Paulson, deceased, et al., Applts.
That Section 7639 C. L. 1913, which provides that in giving decision the
trial court must state the facts found and the conclusions separately, does
not apply where the final decision is embodied in and evidenced by an order,
and no judgment is required to be entered.
That said Section 7639 C. L. 1913, is applicable only to cases where there
is a trial by the court of an issue of fact, arising upon material averments,
presented by formal pleadings, and where following the findings, a judgment
must be entered.
That said Section 7639 C. L. 1913, does not apply to an order confirming
a mortgage foreclosure sale, entered pursuant to Section 2, Chapter 165, Laws
of 1939.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Jansonius, J.
Action by the First National Bank of Waseca against William L. Paulson,
et al., to foreclose a mortgage on real property.
Plaintiff appeals from an order confirming a mortgage foreclosure sale.
AFItIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In Nome State Bank, a corporation, Respt., v. Melvin Brendmoen and
Edna Brendmoen, Applts.
That in an action between a mortgagee and mortgagor for the foreclos-
ure of a chattel mortgage an allegation in the complaint to the effect that
the mortgagee surrendered a copy of the mortgage to the mortgagor is not
essential to the statement of a cause of action.
That the failure of a mortgagee to surrender to the mortgagor a copy of
a chattel mortgage at the time of the execution thereof does not render the
mortgage void as between the parties thereto.
Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Hon. M. J. Englert, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Nanna M. Funk and C. E. Branick, Applts., v. L. R. Baird and T. A.
Tollefson, Respts.
That in an action for specific performance of a contract for sale of real
property, plaintiffs seek relief upon purely equitable grounds; and in order
to be entitled to such relief they must show that they are ready, willing, and
able to fully perform their part of the contract.
That as against the vendees of an executory land contract, the heirs of
the deceased vendor have no right to substitute their personal covenants for
those of the vendor, the vendees having made no contract with the heirs and
not having contracted with the vendor to take conveyance from either her
heirs or assigns.
That where, by the terms of an executory contract for the sale of land,
the vendor agreed "to convey unto the said parties of the second part, or
